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world statistics day
I hope that, by now, it should come as no surprise 
to you that the theme of this year’s World Statistics 
Day is “Better data. Better lives”. Thanks to the 
website – worldstatisticsday.org – we can see versions 
of the logo in languages from Arabic to Vietnamese, 
and I’m sure that it will be a successful day for all the 
participating bodies around the world. This theme 
is vitally important for the work of the statistical 
community worldwide.
When I took over as UK National Statistician last 
year, I restated the aim of the Government Statistical 
Service as “Better Statistics, Better Decisions”. A basic 
example I’ve already used of the power of better data 
to help people make better decisions is the illuminated 
sign on the bus stop showing when the next bus is 
coming. That gives us an informed choice whether to 
wait or start walking instead. 
The history of official statistics in the UK being 
used for decision making is a long one; even if the 
Domesday Book was intended to help the King 
maximise his revenues, the regular publication of bills of 
mortality arose in late Tudor times out of the realisation 
that the rapid growth of London required better 
monitoring of the risk of plague in the public interest. 
More recently, Winston Churchill established the 
Central Statistical Office out of a perceived need to get 
better measures of the output of Britain’s war economy.
Some of the challenges that we in the statistical 
community face if we are to continue to inform the 
decisions that will lead to better lives for everyone were 
examined earlier this year at the meeting of the UN 
Statistical Commission, which I had the honour to 
chair. Items on the agenda included how best to chart 
progress across the world on sustainable development, 
how to mobilise the power of the data revolution, and 
agreeing a plan to lift the art of census-taking to a 
new level. 
However, given what has happened since, 
perhaps the most emotive area we discussed was how 
best to measure refugees and internally displaced 
people. I don’t think any of us, having watched the 
television coverage that this issue has received this 
summer, can fail to recognise it as a key area where 
statisticians have a part to play: not only in informing 
decision making, but informing public debate. 
While much of this applies most strongly to those 
of us who work in official statistics, I believe that all 
professional statisticians have a contribution to make, 
whether through involvement in non-governmental 
organisations, making expert comment available 
through the media or instilling the highest standards 
among the students who will be the statisticians 
of tomorrow. 
So I certainly wish every success to all those across 
the globe who, on 20 October and beyond, will be 
trying to spread the message of World Statistics Day 
that better data can indeed lead to better lives for all 
of us.
Fuel for growth and 
development
World Statistics Day is the ideal time to showcase diverse applications of data, 
and how the work of statisticians is helping improve the lives of people around the 
world. The next 20 pages offer merely a glimpse of the full range of problems to 
which statistical analysis is applied, despite touching on a wide range of issues: from 
economic development to trade and transport, data sharing, human rights and hunger. 
We begin, though, with a special introduction from John Pullinger, the 
UK National Statistician and current chair of the UN Statistical Commission, 
on the importance of World Statistics Day
The revolution 
will be analysed
Two years after a United Nations report called for a “data revolution”, 
Claire Melamed takes stock of how close we have come to achieving that goal
Data has never been so in demand. This may come as 
something of a surprise to the legions of statisticians, 
epidemiologists, demographers, econometricians and 
others who have been labouring away in the face of 
public and political disinterest for decades, but suddenly 
data is the hot political issue, at least in some circles. 
The first inkling of this came with the calls for a 
“data revolution” in a United Nations (UN) report 
from May 2013. A UN panel that featured two 
presidents, a prime minister, the CEO of a Fortune 
500 company and a Nobel Prize winner, among others, 
suggested this revolution was needed to “improve 
the quality of statistics and information available to 
citizens” by taking advantage of “new technology, crowd 
sourcing and improved connectivity”. It was an idea 
whose time had come: this small phrase then unleashed 
a wave of thinking and agonising about data – and in 
particular, about how inadequate is the data on many 
of the world’s gravest problems. 
To the campaigners, the politicians and others who 
use such data, the fact that, for example, there are actual 
reported numbers for just 15% of all malaria deaths1 
and 16% of all births2 was a bit of a shock. These 
percentages, of course, are only estimates. Around 
half of all the data used to monitor the Millennium 
Development Goals – internationally agreed targets for 
tackling extreme poverty – was estimated, and – over 
the life of the programme, which ends this year – there 
was no five-year period in which more than 70% of the 
data needed3 to track the goals was actually available, 
and no one year in which more than 50% of the data 
was available (IEAG secretariat calculations, based on 
figures from UN Statistical Division). 
The data used for monitoring global goals is only 
part of the story. A reliance on nationally representative 
surveys for much of the data that is used to track 
development targets means that for many indicators it 
is almost impossible to disaggregate at a sub-national 
level. A national figure on access to clean water, for 
example, is good for monitoring a country’s progress on 
global goals, but very much less useful in planning the 
investments that will help a country to achieve those 
goals. Without knowledge of where water is short and 
who is lacking access, policy to improve access to water 
is unnervingly like guesswork. This is the situation that 
faces many governments as they try to plan investments 
and resource allocations for health services, for 
education and for infrastructure.
Waking up to the problem
The dawning awareness of the gaps in data has come 
together with other pressures to start to improve the 
quantity and quality of data available. Firstly, on the 
demand side, growing pressures from citizen groups and 
others for more information about what governments 
do in their name has made governments pay more 
attention to what they know and how accurate it is. 
Luckily, this has coincided with dramatic changes on the 
supply side, as new technology slowly improves every 
aspect of data collection, processing and use – from the 
use of tablets for collecting survey data to the use of 
mobile phone records to track disease epidemics. 
So the stage is set for the data revolution. Indeed, 
it is happening all around us. The question is how this 
revolution can be mobilised to fill the gaps in data, 
to improve the information available to governments 
and citizens, and to galvanise both public and private 
sectors to improve services and give people more of 
what they want and need. 
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Last year, the UN Secretary General asked 
a group of the world’s experts on data, the 
Independent Expert Advisory Group on the 
Data Revolution for Sustainable Development 
(IEAG), to help provide some answers to 
that question. The final report, A World 
That Counts, which I authored, argued that 
a collective effort on data is needed to enable 
governments to both achieve and monitor 
the ambitious new Sustainable Development 
Goals, due to be agreed at a special session of 
the United Nations in September 2015.3 
During the production of the report, we 
were offered glimpses of the world of data 
that awaits, if the investments are made. The 
Mtrac programme in Uganda, for example, 
supported by the children’s rights organisation 
UNICEF, the World Health Organization 
and the US Agency for International 
Development, uses SMS surveys, completed 
by health workers, to alert officials to malaria 
outbreaks and to monitor stocks of the 
required drugs at health facilities. Before 
Mtrac, the Ministry of Health had almost 
no data on individual health facilities. Now, 
thanks to more than 20 000 health workers 
who contribute data, the government can 
collect data on thousands of health posts, and 
analyse the results in less than two days, at 
a minimal cost. The vast majority of reports 
are followed up within two weeks, and the 
number of facilities that are out of stock of 
critical drugs to treat malaria at any given time 
has fallen from 85% to 15%.3
It is this combination of old and new 
techniques, with appropriate provision for 
privacy and human rights, that offers the most 
exciting possibilities in the data revolution. 
It is not a question of established techniques 
being superseded by new methods, but of 
how they work together. Traditional data 
collection methods such as surveys can offer 
essential “ground truthing” to newer data 
sources: pictures collected by satellite, or 
mobile phone call records. But these new 
methods can offer the kind of real-time data 
that a survey cannot. It is by putting them 
together that the real, radical, improvements 
will be and are being made. 
What next?
With so much activity already happening, it 
might seem that the wisest course of action is 
to step back and let it happen. It is certainly 
important that any action by governments, 
multilateral institutions and other players 
does not squash the huge creativity and 
innovation that has characterised the data 
revolution so far. 
But there is a real risk of growing 
inequalities in access to data and in capacity 
to use and benefit from new sources of data. 
As always, it is the countries, companies and 
individuals with the most resources that are 
benefiting most from the new opportunities. 
To some extent this is inevitable. But it would 
be a tragedy if, starting at this low base, and 
knowing what we know about the risks of 
rising inequality, action were not taken to try 
and spread the benefits and to use the data 
revolution to improve data on the people 
and issues about which least is known – for 
example, the estimated 230 million children 
under 5 whose births are not registered.4 
This is where collective action – to encourage 
investment in areas of greater need, to provide 
incentives for filling the world’s most pressing 
data gaps, and coming together to solve 
critical problems – can help to even the scales 
and help all to benefit. 
The need is there, and the report of 
the IEAG has been followed by action 
on a range of fronts. The UN system has 
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An Ethiopian woman sells crops in a crowded market. Farmers can now receive regular updates on the export price of key crops through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
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been mobilised to continue the work, by 
committing to sponsor a “World Data 
Forum” in 2016. There continues to be a 
focus on how data can be improved as a 
key part of achieving the new Sustainable 
Development Goals – and a recent conference 
on Financing for Development confirmed 
the importance of new investments in data 
collection and use to make that possible. A 
group of governments, companies and civil 
society organisations – among them the USA, 
Kenya, Colombia and Mexico; Mastercard 
and Orange; and the ONE campaign and 
Civicus – are working together and with 
others to form a global partnership on data for 
sustainable development. 
But a revolution is not simply a report, a 
world forum or a global partnership, important 
though they are. All of these things are just 
means to an end. That end is improvements 
in the lives of people. Human happiness 
can seem quite removed from analysis of 
satellite photos or thousands of call records 
on a spreadsheet, or the painstaking work of 
cleaning survey data. But the links are real. 
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, for 
example, sends price information to farmers 
regularly throughout the day – and farmers’ 
share of the export price for key crops doubled 
within four years of the exchange opening. As 
a trader commented, somewhat ruefully, at 
a public meeting: “Even if I wanted to cheat 
farmers I can’t, because they know the prices 
before I do” (bit.ly/1NCyMtK). In Seoul, the 
use of mobile phone records tracking people’s 
movement around the city at night enabled 
better planning and pricing of night bus 
routes, saving poorer residents an estimated 
$1.2 million overall (bit.ly/1Ikkbek). 
The start of something bigger
This is just the beginning. As policy-makers, 
funders and campaigners wake up to how 
much is not known, and the ways in which 
this prevents action on things that they care 
about, the demand for more and better data 
can only grow. A host of new data providers, 
working together with established agencies, 
are poised to fill those gaps. And these groups 
are slowly being brought together, and learning 
how to work together for the collective good. 
It may be surprising to find data in 
the international political spotlight. But 
everyone who thinks that it is important to 
have good data, to produce good information 
and ultimately good policy, should seize this 
moment and use it to raise the investments, 
the innovations and the collaborations that 
can create a lasting legacy.
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A revolution is not simply a 
report, a world forum or a 
global partnership. All of these 
things are just means to an 
end. That end is improvements 
in the lives of people
Shared learning
Collaborating on statistical initiatives is one way of plugging gaps in knowledge. 
George Bentley explains how Statistics Canada is helping Caribbean countries 
learn more about themselves
looking to enhance their statistical systems. 
Through measuring their socioeconomic 
landscape, the hope is that these countries can 
develop policies to improve the well-being of 
their people. 
The Project for the Regional Advancement 
of Statistics in the Caribbean (PRASC) 
focuses on four key areas for enhancement, the 
first being a country’s national accounts – a 
statistical cornerstone that describes the basic 
elements of an economy, including national 
output, expenditure and income. PRASC 
will identify gaps in data and data collection 
methods and suggest solutions to address 
Canada owes its national statistics office in 
large part to a group of countries that came 
together in 1918 to help the Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics – as it was then known 
– find its feet. Now, as Statistics Canada, the 
agency will spend the next seven years offering 
support to 14 Caribbean countries that are 
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Economic Development, Planning, Trade and 
Cooperatives in Grenada. Speaking at the 
project’s first meeting in April, he explained 
how agencies in the region do the best they 
can with limited resources, but most struggle 
to provide the data that allow policy-makers 
to make informed decisions.
“Therein lies the need to measure 
accurately the magnitudes of economic 
indicators such as our gross domestic 
product, our external trade positions, and 
our rates of unemployment and poverty. No 
longer can we go on ‘feelings, intuitions and 
premonitions’ to make decisions that should 
affect the lives of our people in the region”, 
said the minister.
Almost a century ago, the sharing of 
knowledge assisted Canada in shaping and 
building its first national statistical office. 
Through PRASC and other initiatives, 
Statistics Canada is committed to paying 
it forward.
George Bentley is senior writer and editor with 
Statistics Canada. A long-time journalist, he has been 
with the Canadian government since 2000, working 
with the departments of Finance and Agriculture, 
before joining the statistical agency in 2013
Inaugural meeting of PRASC, April 2015, Grenada
them. It will also support the national statistical 
offices of the 14 participating countries as 
they transition to the new framework of the 
System of National Accounts 2008, the latest 
version of the international statistical standard 
for national accounts adopted by the United 
Nations Statistical Commission.
To support the national accounts, 
PRASC’s second area of focus is on 
improving the infrastructure for economic 
surveys, particularly statistical methods and 
processes that result in an integrated approach 
to business surveys. 
For example, work is already under 
way in Belize to help that nation build its 
economic statistical infrastructure, starting 
with its Business Register – something 
which is used as the principal framework 
for the country’s economic statistics. In late 
June, representatives from Statistics Canada 
travelled south to meet with their Belizean 
counterparts. The objective of this first 
mission was to assist with the development 
phase of the Business Establishment Survey 
using the generic statistical business process 
model approach. The aim is to develop and 
produce a detailed set of supply and use tables 
for the country in early summer 2016. 
PRASC’s third key area, while similar 
to the second, shifts the focus from economic 
surveys to household surveys. The idea is to 
build a survey framework that can be adapted 
from one survey to another. It pays particular 
attention to disaggregating statistics by gender – 
an area of focus for the international community.
The fourth aim of the project is to 
develop communication and dissemination 
strategies to share information, thereby 
enhancing the first three areas. The Caribbean 
region has identified, as a priority, the need to 
improve dissemination tools and the exchange 
of data between partners, as well as strategies, 
tools and expertise to communicate with 
stakeholders and data users. 
A staged approach to learning and 
implementing
PRASC takes a phased “learning-by-doing” 
approach, with a logical progression from 
knowledge sharing/training, to adaptation and 
testing of newly acquired best practices and 
tools, to national implementation, and finally, 
to regional sharing.
The need for this is real, according 
to the Hon. Oliver Joseph, Minister for 
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Signs of hunger
A surge in food prices between 2006 and 2008, and 
again in 2010, took many by surprise, and left many 
millions of people without the means to stave off 
hunger. A 2011 report by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) identified several 
factors that led to the price rises, among which were 
weather shocks such as drought, which led to a decline 
in wheat production, and rising production costs and 
increased demand for meat (and animal feed) in large 
developing countries.1 
The FAO forecast for the future of food prices 
was far from comforting. “Prices are generally expected 
to rise because continued population and economic 
growth will put upward pressure on demand, as will 
the anticipated increased use of biofuels”, it said. 
“Natural resource constraints, especially climate change 
and the limited availability of productive land and 
water in some regions, pose substantial challenges to 
producing food at affordable prices.”
Climate change might also make food prices 
more unstable, the FAO noted. “If the frequency of 
extreme weather events increases, production shocks 
will be more frequent, which will tend to make prices 
more volatile.”
While extensive research has been conducted 
on the relationship between climate and agricultural 
yields, access to food is a multidimensional problem 
that cannot be explained by agricultural productivity 
alone. If the international community wishes to take 
steps to tackle the knock-on effects of higher and 
more volatile food prices – namely, increasing hunger 
for those people who are no longer able to afford to 
eat – predictive models with demonstrable accuracy 
are needed to identify conditions likely to lead to 
food-insecure situations, support interventions, and 
reduce suffering.2 In the long term, an improved 
understanding of the physical, cultural, and socio-
economic conditions that lead to food insecurity is 
needed to inform adaptation strategies based on strong 
forecasting indicators.
A complex problem
Statistical models could play an important role in 
identifying food-insecure situations as measurement 
of undernourishment currently relies on resource-
intensive surveys that are typically only available once 
every few years. These models could also provide 
Julie Shortridge, Stefanie Falconi, Ben Zaitchik and Seth Guikema explain how 
statistical models can be used to predict undernourishment around the world based 
on climatic, social and economic factors
Evaluated models
The following models were tested for their ability to predict undernourishment.
• generalised linear regression models (GLMs);
• generalised additive models (GAMs), which predict the response variable as the 
sum of multiple smoothing functions applied over each predictor variable;
• Gaussian mixture models (GMM), which assume that unidentified subpopulations 
exist within the sample population;
• a single classification and regression tree (CART), which partitions the data into 
binary subsets based on the value of predictor variables;
• a Bayesian additive regression tree (BART), which averages predictions over 
multiple regression trees whose structures are constrained by an underlying 
Bayesian probability model;
• a bagged CART (BC) model, which averages predictions over multiple regression 
trees, each of which is fitted on a bootstrap resampled version of the data;
• a random forest (RF) model, which averages predictions over multiple regression 
trees, each of which is fitted using a subset of predictor variables to reduce 
correlation between tree predictions;
• an ensemble mean model, which averaged predictions from the highest-performing 
models described above.
Two null models were included for comparison purposes: in evaluation 1 the null 
model assumed that undernourishment remained unchanged from the previous period, 
and in evaluation 2 the null model’s prediction was equal to the mean prevalence of 
undernourishment in all countries.
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insights into the relationship between 
climatic, social and economic conditions 
and food-security outcomes. Yet, statistical 
analyses of food security to date have been 
relatively limited. 
One challenge is the many complex non-
linear relationships that exist between climate, 
socio-economic conditions, and food-security 
outcomes. This complexity is likely to make 
a muddle of linear regression approaches, 
leading to limited success in developing 
models with good predictive accuracy. The 
use of more sophisticated non-linear models 
could therefore address these issues.
Recent work by our team of researchers 
at Johns Hopkins University assessed multiple 
regression and data-mining approaches 
for their ability to predict country-level 
prevalence of undernourishment based 
on socio-economic, climatic, and food-
production covariates – that is, variables that 
might have predictive ability. 
Two evaluations were conducted. In 
the first (evaluation 1), information on 
undernourishment from previous years was 
included as a covariate, resulting in predictive 
models that could complement survey-based 
estimates. In the second (evaluation 2), 
previous information on undernourishment 
levels was not included as a covariate, resulting 
in models that could be used to estimate 
food insecurity in countries without previous 
measurements or projections for many years 
into the future.
We evaluated the relationship between 
climatic and socio-economic conditions and 
national-level food insecurity in 144 countries 
during the period 2000–2002. FAO estimates 
of the prevalence of undernourishment, which 
represent the percentage of the population 
whose food consumption is continually below 
a minimum level, were chosen as a response 
variable to represent food insecurity in 
each country.
Three classes of variables were used to 
predict undernourishment. Socio-economic 
variables included per-capita gross domestic 
product and the percentage of crop areas 
equipped for irrigation. In the first evaluation 
only, this also included the prevalence of 
undernourishment for the period 1995–1997 
(the closest previous period for which 
undernourishment estimates were available). 
Food trade and production variables 
included the quantity of food imports, net 
food trade, and the percentage of protein 
and fat in dietary consumption. Latitude 
was included as a covariate to account for the 
observed relationship between geography and 
economic conditions.3 
Climatic variables included 
measurements of growing degree days 
(GDD, a measure of heat accumulation 
available for plant growth), precipitation, 
relative humidity, and soil moisture. Because 
a cross-sectional evaluation of mean climate 
conditions would simply measure differences 
between countries (for example, Bangladesh 
is warm and wet compared to Canada), we 
used anomalies to assess climatic conditions 
during the response period relative to 
the prior decade. For instance, if historic 
annual rainfall in Ethiopia has a mean value 
of 1000 mm and a standard deviation of 
250 mm, then a year with 750 mm of rainfall 
would have a precipitation anomaly of –1. 
Standard deviations were also included to 
represent the variability in climatic conditions 
over the growing season in each country – for 
example, whether rainfall was characterised 
by regular moderate events or heavy storms 
followed by long dry periods.
Multiple models were tested using 100 
iterations of random hold-out cross validation. 
In each iteration, approximately 10% of 
samples were randomly selected and removed 
from the data set. The remaining data was 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation (SD) of MSE for models based on hold-out cross-validation. Bold italic results indicate models that outperform the null model 
based on mean squared error
GLM1 GLM2 GAM1 GAM2 GMM2 GMM3 BART CART RF BC Ensemble Null
Evaluation 1 (including data from undernourishment in previous years)
MSE mean  
(all countries)
22.15 22.14 32.52 33.03 24.24 20.2 29.89 22.32 41.03 24.51 17.96 23.88
MSE SD  
(all countries)
14.32 13.15 25.81 24.87 17.27 11.28 18.77 16.18 29.14 15.42 10.4 15.36
MSE mean  
(high undernourishment countries)
37.24 37.44 54.32 55.51 40.72 33.99 50.29 34.65 66.20 39.23 29.45 40.03
MSE SD  
(high undernourishment countries)
25.14 25.77 44.52 43.91 29.88 18.96 34.12 24.73 46.88 24.11 17.31 27.9
Evaluation 2 (no data from undernourishment in previous years)
MSE mean  
(all countries)
134.46 98.83 252.65 166.96 117.37 108.45 95.92 108.08 96.66 86.70 87.15 184.47
MSE SD  
(all countries)
94.93 52.71 459.82 282.07 65.38 53.07 52.47 57.24 57.15 48.09 48.65 72.65
MSE mean  
(high undernourishment countries)
204.67 153.43 363.77 237.57 179.70 166.90 153.38 161.83 154.00 128.42 137.33 230.50
MSE SD  
(high undernourishment countries)
147.08 84.47 636.78 383.22 109.60 85.81 85.50 86.18 92.63 71.17 79.41 127.88
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used to fit the models and then predict 
undernourishment in the removed samples, 
providing a comparison of their out-of-sample 
predictive accuracy. In each iteration, the 
mean square error (MSE) between predicted 
and actual undernourishment was estimated 
for all countries in the hold-out sample, 
as well as for only those countries with 
actual undernourishment above 5% (‘high 
undernourishment’ countries). 
Finding the right predictors
The results of our testing indicate that 
country-level undernourishment can be 
accurately predicted by using previous 
undernourishment information in 
combination with predictor variables 
related to socio-economic conditions, food 
production and trade, and climate. 
We found that the highest-
performing model when data on previous 
undernourishment was available (evaluation 
1) was the ensemble model, which averaged 
Figure 1. Relative covariate influence in the ensemble model from evaluation 1. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bounds
Figure 2. Relative covariate influence in the ensemble model in evaluation 2. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bounds
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predictions from the LM, GMM, CART, and 
bagged CART models (see Table 1 and box 
on page 28 and 29 for description of models 
tested). In both evaluations, the ensemble 
models achieved statistically significant 
reductions in predictive error compared to the 
null models and exhibited a lower variance 
in MSE, indicating a reduced possibility for 
instances where MSE is very high.
Evaluation of the relationship between 
predictor variables and model predictions in 
the two ensemble models was conducted using 
partial dependence plots that demonstrate 
the marginal influence of changing a single 
predictor variable while all others remain 
constant. A relatively flat partial dependence 
plot indicates that the covariate of interest has 
little influence over the model’s predictions, 
while a large change in response variable values 
indicates that the covariate has a large degree 
of influence in model predictions.
The partial dependence plots from 
evaluation 1 suggest that a variety of 
indicators are important in predicting 
undernourishment in the ensemble model 
(Figure 1). High previous undernourishment, 
a decrease in agricultural production, a high 
proportion of calories from fat and a negative 
food trade balance all led to high predictions 
of undernourishment. Highly variable 
humidity levels, low temperature variability, 
and warmer than average temperatures 
were also associated with high rates 
of undernourishment. 
Without information on previous 
undernourishment, the ensemble model 
relies more heavily on GDP and latitude, 
with higher undernourishment predicted 
in low-GDP, low-latitude countries (Figure 
2). Lower undernourishment is associated 
with a positive trade balance and high levels 
of food imports into the country. In terms of 
climatic variables, high undernourishment 
was predicted in countries with highly 
variable precipitation and soil moisture, 
a negative relative humidity anomaly for 
the 2000–2002 period, and low levels of 
temperature variability.
To further assess the predictive 
capacity of the ensemble model from 
evaluation 1, the ensemble and null models 
were used to generate predictions for the 
period 2006–2008 (the next period in 
which FAO data was available). The error 
(predicted undernourishment minus actual 
undernourishment) for each country is shown 
in Figure 3. Both the ensemble and null model 
tended to overestimate undernourishment 
in Africa and South America, although 
errors were smaller in the ensemble model. 
However, the ensemble model also tended to 
overestimate undernourishment in Southeast 
Asia compared to the null model.
A useful tool?
While the predictions were not without error, 
the predictors used in the ensemble model 
are generally more easily estimated and more 
frequently available than FAO projections of 
undernourishment, providing a useful way 
to predict undernourishment when surveyed 
estimates of food insecurity are unavailable. 
And while a cross-sectional evaluation 
such as this does not provide the statistical 
power needed to prove a causal association 
between predictors and undernourishment, 
evaluation of variable influence over model 
predictions can identify which indicators 
are the most valuable in estimating 
undernourishment (and thus inform data 
collection activities), illuminate correlations 
that may warrant further assessment, 
and inform the development of systems 
dynamics models. 
Moreover, it can identify overlooked 
variables that are often neglected from 
food security studies. For example, while 
a number of studies have assessed the 
influence that precipitation has on crop yields, 
our results indicate that other hydrologic 
variables, particularly relative humidity, 
evapotranspiration, and soil moisture, 
could be equally important in predicting 
food insecurity.
Indeed, we found that climatic conditions 
must be considered in conjunction with 
socio-economic influences on food availability 
and access to accurately predict food security 
outcomes. By providing insights into these 
relationships and a mechanism for predicting 
undernourishment using readily available 
data, statistical models like those described 
here could be a useful tool for organisations 
tasked with understanding and addressing 
food insecurity. 
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Slavery, in its contemporary form, presents 
pressing challenges for the social scientist. 
The first is that it is ongoing, widespread, 
and destructive. The knowledge that any 
delay in illuminating and understanding this 
crime might have damaging or fatal results 
for those suffering enslavement requires a 
tenacious and timely response. As with public 
health statisticians confronting an unfolding 
epidemic, an unhurried research plan is not 
appropriate, however desirable. 
The second pressing challenge is 
that slavery is a hidden crime. Illegal in all 
countries, slaveholders work hard to conceal 
their activities, offering a daunting task to 
anyone who would seek to measure the 
extent of slavery. This article presents both 
an extrapolation technique for estimating the 
prevalence of this crime at the national level, 
and a test of the accuracy of that technique. 
Perhaps the last precise measurement of 
slavery occurred in 1860, when the United 
States Census enumerated those held in 
legal bondage. In that year, the total number 
of men, women, and children owned by 
slaveholders was 3 953 760, accounting for 
13% of the US population. 
From that time until the late twentieth 
century, however, there was no reliable 
measurement of the extent of slavery in any 
country, with the possible exception of the 
records of slave labourers kept by the Nazi 
regime during the Second World War. As the 
number of countries making slavery illegal 
increased, so did the difficulty of measuring 
this hidden criminal activity. 
Advancing methods
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, 
criminal groups exploited newly opened 
international borders and human trafficking 
crime increased in the developed world. 
Responding to a growing concern about global 
trafficking and slavery in the 1990s, the first 
attempts were made to achieve a global estimate. 
In the short period since then, the methodology 
has advanced rapidly through three stages. 
The first stage relied upon secondary 
sources, including governmental records, 
non-governmental organisations and service 
provider tallies, and reports in the media – in 
short, any source that might shed light on 
the extent of slavery. Even when sources 
were systematically assessed for reliability, 
these estimates1, 2 could only be seen as an 
approximation of the global situation. 
One elaboration of this technique in the 
US was an attempt to triangulate secondary 
sources with surveys of service providers and 
government and law enforcement records. 
While the estimates derived in this first stage 
were not widely different from each other, 
there was no way to ensure their validity.
The second stage was set in motion 
by the pioneering work of Pennington et 
al.3 in 2009. This team introduced a series 
of questions concerning human trafficking 
into a random sample health survey of 
five eastern European countries (Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria). 
Employing random sample surveys, they were 
able to build the first reliable estimate of the 
proportion of each country’s population that 
had been enslaved, as many of those trafficked 
across borders often end up in hock to those 
who transported them and must work to pay 
off the costs of their journey. 
The work of Pennington et al. was critical 
to the advancement of the methodology for 
two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrated that, at 
least in some countries and circumstances, 
enslavement could be measured through 
random sample surveys of the full population. 
Secondly, by fixing valid data points for these 
five countries, it became possible to begin the 
process of estimating the range of prevalence 
of modern slavery across countries, as well as 
using these and other emerging survey results 
to extrapolate the prevalence of slavery in 
other countries.4 
In addressing the question of range, by 
2009 it had become clear that slavery cases 
were being reported in virtually all countries 
with a population over 100 000. For that 
reason, the low end of the global range of 
prevalence of modern slavery for countries 
in which measurement was possible was 
assumed to be greater than zero. In the 
same year, a report from the United States 
Agency for International Development and 
the Pan American Development Foundation5 
provided a random sample survey of child 
restavèk slavery in Haiti. The proportion 
of the Haitian population (2.3%) found 
to be in this pervasive form of slavery was 
assumed to be in the upper range of the global 
distribution of slavery.
In 2014, a more robust extrapolation 
became possible with this sense of the range 
of prevalence across countries, supported by 
an increase in the amount of data available 
from random sample surveys. In addition to 
data from the Pennington et al. and Haiti 
surveys, random sample surveys of slavery 
were also identified in three more countries 
(Niger, Namibia, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo), and an additional seven 
(Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Nepal, and Russia) were commissioned by 
the Walk Free Foundation using the Gallup 
International World Poll (bit.ly/1FfBCN8), 
which also provided data for three other 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Malaysia), 
resulting in data points from a total of 19 
random sample surveys. 
At the most basic level the process of 
extrapolation assumed that the 167 most 
populous countries were ranged along a 
continuum from those with the lowest 
Slavery is an affront to the fundamental human right to liberty. In our June 2015 issue, 
we looked at estimates of the number of victims of slavery living in the UK. In this 
follow-up article, Jacqueline Joudo Larsen, Monti Narayan Datta and Kevin Bales 
discuss the crucial role extrapolation plays in assessing the number of global victims 
Perhaps the last precise 
measurement of slavery 
occurred in 1860, when 
the United States Census 
enumerated those held in legal 
bondage: 3.95m, or 13% of 
the US population
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prevalence of slavery to those with the highest 
prevalence of slavery. Further, the data points 
derived from the 19 random sample surveys 
available were considered to be indicative of 
similar countries along the continuum. 
In the 2014 Global Slavery Index, the 
process of extrapolating estimates of modern 
slavery followed five steps. In addition to 
the collection of data on prevalance, a large 
number of variables were collected for all 
167 countries to measure vulnerability to 
enslavement across five dimensions: state 
stability, social discrimination, presence or 
absence of human rights protections, economic 
and social development, and presence of 
governmental slavery policy. The first step 
involved applying a K-means cluster analysis 
(see box) to group the 167 countries into 
seven distinct groups using these dimensions 
of vulnerability. The research team employed 
K-means as a clustering algorithm, deciding on 
the final cluster out of a dozen trials that had 
the highest pseudo-F score. Seven groups were 
chosen as there were seven prevalence surveys 
that used the same instruments and data 
collection methods, and ideally, each survey 
could be applied to a unique group. 
The seven groupings were sufficiently 
distinct on overall mean values, although 
the minimum and maximum values did 
indicate some overlap among countries at 
the bottom of one list and top of the next. 
The extrapolation process then followed 
these steps: 
1. Countries within each group were 
ranked according to their mean 
vulnerability score, from low to high. 
This aggregated countries that are 
more alike as compared to those that 
are less alike. 
2. Geography was also important to 
consider within and among clusters, 
given that some countries share many 
similar attributes that correlate highly 
with geography. Where available 
and relevant, the final calculation 
of estimated enslavement would 
incorporate survey data for a country 
within the same geographical region to 
reflect regional similarities.
3. Once this process was concluded, the 
research team examined countries on a 
case-by-case basis to determine if the 
extrapolation process corresponded to 
data collected from secondary source 
estimates. Country-level adjustments 
were also made in discussion with 
experts on specific countries. 
K-means cluster analysis
K-means is a statistical method which groups similar items into clusters, ensuring that items 
not in the same cluster are as different as possible. This is achieved by allocating an item to 
the cluster with the nearest centroid, or the mean of the cluster. The cluster’s mean is then 
recalculated and the process of allocating items to clusters begins again until no items change 
groups, or those changes do not make a substantial difference in the definition of a cluster. The 
Calinski–Harabasz pseudo-F score describes the ratio of between-cluster variance to within-
cluster variance, whereby large values indicate distinct clustering.
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4. A final, downward, adjustment was 
made for small island developing states 
in order to ensure that estimates for 
these nations erred on the conservative 
side in light of (in most cases) their 
remoteness, small but growing 
populations, limited resources, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, and 
limited potential for economic growth, 
among other development challenges.
This extrapolation process yielded a 
prevalence estimate for each country 
calculated as a proportion of the total 
population that was enslaved within that 
country. For all 167 countries this produced a 
total global estimate in 2014 of 35.8 million 
enslaved people. 
A valid estimate?
Following the release of the Global Slavery 
Index in 2014, a further 19 surveys were 
commissioned by the Walk Free Foundation. 
In addition, multiple systems estimation 
(MSE) was used to compute a new prevalence 
estimate for the UK.6 These new surveys allow 
a test of the extrapolation procedures, and can 
be added to previous surveys that were carried 
out after extrapolation estimates were made. 
The survey data to which the 
extrapolation estimates can be compared is 
in three sets. Seven countries were surveyed 
in 2014, a further 19 in 2015, and surveys 
by other researchers were found for two 
other countries.7, 8 The addition of the 
UK’s MSE based estimate brings the total 
number of countries to 29. Altogether these 
countries, and thus these surveys, represent 
3.3 billion people, approximately 46% of the 
global population. 
A comparison of the extrapolation 
estimates of slavery to the estimates derived 
from random sample representative surveys 
yields very promising results. As Table 
1 shows, all but one of the extrapolation 
estimates of the prevalence of slavery within a 
national population fell within one percentage 
point of the estimates arrived through random 
sample surveys. 
After the publication of extrapolation 
estimates in the 2013 and 2014 editions of 
the Global Slavery Index, there were concerns 
and reservations about the reliability of this 
technique. While we will continue to practise 
continuous and incremental testing and 
improvement of the methodology, the findings 
presented here provide a level of confidence 
in the use of extrapolation estimates in the 
absence of further random sample surveys. 
The extrapolation technique presented 
here is not the only, or the best, means by 
which to estimate the prevalence of slavery. 
But at this time, and for many countries, it is 
the only method available, and will continue 
to be well into the future. This may be 
because ongoing conflict precludes on-the-
ground survey work, or because the relevant 
government refuses to allow research to take 
place, or simply because of a lack of resources 
needed to carry out extensive random sample 
surveys. This test of the extrapolated estimates 
against the subsequent random sample survey 
results, however, supports the continued use 
of this technique until more precise methods 
are available.
Table 1. Difference in the percentage of the population estimated to be enslaved
 
2013 extrapolation-based 
estimate, to 2014  
survey-based estimate
2014 extrapolation-based 
estimate, to 2015  
survey-based estimate
Pakistan 0.08
Indonesia 0.20
Brazil 0.03
Nigeria 0.07
Ethiopia 0.30
Nepal 0.12
Russia 0.37
Namibia 0.21
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.43
India* 0.49
The Philippines 0.13
South Africa 0.26
Ghana 0.36
Thailand 0.69
Mauritania 1.59
Bangladesh 0.52
Vietnam 0.21
Cambodia 0.61
Myanmar 0.52
Sri Lanka 0.29
Tunisia 0.46
Guatemala 0.63
Chile 0.05
Dominican Republic 0.81
Poland 0.42
Hungary 0.03
Bolivia 0.21
Mexico 0.19
* In the case of India, this is a preliminary result based upon a nationally representative, random 
sample survey (n = 3000). The final estimate, however, will integrate data from a further 12 
surveys, with samples representative at a state level. The combined sample size of 15 000 will 
provide a more robust analysis of India.
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We have moved quickly to disseminate 
and publish these findings not simply because 
methodological testing and transparency are 
the absolute foundation of science, but also 
because of the immediate and pressing threat 
that slavery represents to human well-being. 
We are committed to ending the suffering 
and cost of slavery. We are certain that 
clear and objective measurement produced 
within the framework of globally accepted 
scientific process (open data, methodological 
transparency, and anonymous peer review) 
can provide the crucial metrics against 
which the progress of liberation – of human 
freedom – can be measured.  
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Monitoring travel 
behaviour in England 
A 50-year journey
Transport matters. It provides access to employment and 
education opportunities, to shops and leisure. In 2014, 
residents of England made on average over 900 trips 
and spent the equivalent of an hour every day travelling. 
Collecting statistics to measure and understand patterns 
of travel behaviour to inform transport planning and 
policy is therefore of national importance. 
The National Travel Survey (NTS) provides 
the only authoritative national source of data linking 
personal travel behaviour to the social demographic 
characteristics of the traveller. As the survey 
methodology (see box, page 41) has remained broadly 
unchanged since its introduction in 1965, trends can 
be monitored consistently. Together, these factors 
make the NTS uniquely important in exploring 
changes in patterns of travel as the background 
to policy formulation, modelling, and ultimately 
investment decisions.
The most striking trend of the past half century 
is that, at the individual level, we are travelling further 
but not more often. Indeed, the total number of trips 
people make on average in a year has remained fairly 
stable since 1965 (Figure 1). However, the distance we 
travel has almost doubled over the same period. And so 
the trips we make are getting longer on average.
But while the distance travelled has increased, 
the time we spend travelling has remained remarkably 
unchanged. So the trips we make have got faster. 
Perhaps even more remarkably, the distribution of trip 
times has also remained broadly unchanged (Figure 2). 
In 1965, Britain became the first country in the world to collect data on national 
patterns of travel behaviour through its National Travel Survey. As the survey 
reaches its 50th anniversary, it remains a key source of data on how and why we 
travel. Delphine Robineau and Matthew Tranter explore the trends
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To what extent are these long-term 
trends driven by a change in reasons for 
travelling?
Why we travel 
Transport is a derived demand; in most cases, 
people are travelling for a particular purpose, 
rather than solely for the pleasure of travelling. 
Figure 3 suggests little change in trip purpose 
over time. The major difference in trip 
purpose is the increase in escorting trips 
(where the main purpose is to accompany 
someone else), which could be partly because 
more people are being driven to places by car.
The rest of the difference observed in 
trip purpose is likely to be partly attributable 
to demographic changes. For example, the 
decrease in education trips may be explained 
to some extent by the decreasing share 
of school-age children in the population. 
Similarly, a larger retired population could be 
reducing the number of work-related trips per 
person averaged over the whole population. 
Overall, the stability of trip purposes over 
time is remarkable.
The key factor affecting trends in 
travel over the past 50 years is the growth in 
access to cars. If we look at the share of the 
population that holds driving licences now 
compared to the past (Figure 4), we see that 
in 1965, just 10% of women aged 17 and 
above had a driving licence, compared to 50% 
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personal business
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Figure 4. Change in driving licence holding, 1965 to now. (Note: The socio-economic grouping used here 
replicates the scale used in the publication of the 1965 results. The socio-economic position generally lowers 
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Figure 5. Change in car availability, 1965 to now
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Figure 6. Stage mode of travel (excluding walks), 1965 and now
Figures for 1965 have been estimated from later surveys data, but this was not possible for trip stages walked. Therefore, modal comparisons presented here exclude walks.
0 150 300 450
Bus
Car/van driver
Car/van passenger
Bicycle
Rail
Other transport
Overall
1965 2014
0 150 300 450
Bus
Car/van driver
Car/van passenger
Bicycle
Rail
Other transport
0 150 300 450
Bus
Car/van driver
Car/van passenger
Bicycle
Rail
Other transport
By household car availability
1965 2014
Figure 3. Trips by main purpose, 1975/76 and now. 
Figures presented here relate to 1975/76, the 
earliest date for which comparable and reliable 
data on trips by purpose is available
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of men. Today, 67% of women hold a licence, 
compared to 80% of men. Driving licence 
holding has increased among women of all 
ages. For men, older age groups are now more 
likely to hold a licence than before, but for 
young males the numbers remain similar to 
50 years ago. Driving licences have also spread 
more widely in lower socio-economic groups.
So there are now more people with 
access to cars, and household car ownership 
has increased. Indeed, it has become far 
more common for households to own several 
vehicles (Figure 5) – although, having a car, 
or several cars, is more frequent for higher 
socio-economic groups than it is for low 
socio-economic groups. The gap has narrowed 
over time, but disparities still exist.
How we travel
As car availability has grown, so car use has 
increased. Today, the car accounts for more 
than twice as much travel as it did in 1965. 
Use of other travel modes has decreased, 
particularly bus use, which has dropped by 
around two-thirds since the NTS began 
(Figure 6). Figures from later survey years 
show that walking trips have also declined, 
especially for short distances (under 1 mile).
All household types have seen an 
increase in car use, even those without direct 
access to a car (Figure 6). While the bus 
remains the most frequent mode of transport 
for people in no-car households (when walks 
are excluded), they are travelling more now as 
passengers in cars.
The increasing use of cars, along with 
the development of better road infrastructure, 
has meant that people can travel further and 
faster, widening the range of opportunities 
available within a given travel time, leading 
to increasing trip distance. Again, this is 
particularly the case for women and older 
people, who travel much further on average 
than 50 years ago, whereas average mileage by 
young men was in fact lower in 2014 than in 
1965 (Figure 7, page 40).
These trends are observed in other 
countries which have tracked travel behaviour 
over a similar period. For example, in France, 
the spread of car ownership, especially for 
lower socio-economic groups, has followed 
a similar trend in the last 30 years.1 Similar Figure 5. Change i  car availability, 1965 to now
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Figure 6. Stage mode of travel (excluding walks), 1965 and now
Figures for 1965 have been estimated from later surveys data, but this was not possible for trip stages walked. Therefore, modal comparisons presented here exclude walks.
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Figure 5. Change in car availability, 1965 to now
Figure 6. Stage mode of travel (excluding walks), 1965 and now. Figures for 1965 have been estimated from later survey data, but this was not possible for trip stages 
walked. Therefore, modal comparisons presented here exclude walks
The increasing use of cars, 
along with the development of 
better road infrastructure, has 
meant that people can travel 
further and faster
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trends in distance travelled and increase of car 
availability have also been measured since the 
late 1960s by personal travel surveys in the 
United States.2
Changing trends?
While we might expect to see changes in 
travel patterns over the course of half a 
century, it is perhaps more important to note 
recent developments – particularly those of 
the last decade.3 Overall trip rates appear to 
have peaked in the mid-1990s and to have 
fallen steadily since then, with a decline in 
walking and car driver trips in particular. 
The average distance travelled has stopped 
growing, which is influenced by trends in car 
travel (Figure 8). Conversely, public transport 
use – particularly rail – has increased, 
although it still accounts for only 3% of all 
trips made.
Understanding these trends matters 
because of their implications for the future. 
Trip rates are a fundamental part of the 
models and forecasts of the UK Department 
for Transport (DfT). In turn these models are 
crucial in the appraisal of transport schemes 
and investment, such as the recent £15 billion 
Road Investment Strategy. This is the reason 
why DfT continues to monitor travel trends 
and improve on the evidence base to better 
understand and attempt to explain the 
patterns observed, drawing on a range of 
sources including NTS data.4 
For example, we see that the high costs 
of learning to drive and reduced employment 
rates have contributed to declining car 
use among the young, while changes in 
company car taxation have reduced mileage 
for higher-income, middle-aged groups. 
Meanwhile, mileage for women and older 
people continues to grow. Evidence in other 
areas is more limited – for example, growth 
in home-working appears to have reduced 
commuting trips, though the effect does not 
appear substantial, and the potential impact of 
growth in online shopping, use of social media 
(which could affect visits to friends) and other 
impacts through technology are not yet clear. 
Urbanisation too is playing its part, 
with more people living in London and 
metropolitan areas where people are more 
likely to travel by public transport than drive. 
For example, 43% of households in London 
do not have access to a car today, compared to 
24% of households living in urban areas and 
only 10% of households in rural areas.
Though drawing conclusions is not easy, 
the initial work suggests that, at the aggregate 
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level, growth in road traffic is likely to resume, 
as growth in incomes, declining driving 
costs (thanks to improved fuel efficiencies) 
and greater car accessibility push up car 
use. However, the DfT has – for the first 
time – used an extrapolation of the falling 
trip rate as a scenario in its most recent road 
traffic forecasts. It turns out that even in this 
case, the projected growth in population and 
commercial travel means traffic levels are 
expected to increase, although the timing and 
pattern of road demand do vary.5 
The road ahead
Investment in transport and the growth of car 
use over the last 50 years have enabled us to 
travel further for the same purposes, widening 
employment and leisure opportunities, 
particularly for women and older people. But 
trends may be changing, and understanding 
the reasons and implications is crucial to 
ensure sound decisions regarding future 
investment. Good data and statistics are the 
cornerstone of transport decision-making.
The World Statistics Day is an occasion 
to celebrate the importance of data sources 
like the NTS, which provides an example of 
the value of maintaining a consistent, high-
quality data source over time. It also reminds 
us of the need for constant improvement, 
especially in the context of new technologies 
changing both the way we travel and the way 
we collect data. Though it seems unlikely 
we will be collecting data in the same way 
in 2065 (see box), the need to understand 
travel behaviour is likely to remain crucial 
for transport planning and policy. Ultimately, 
it informs decision-making that has a real 
impact on the lives of millions of people.
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NTS methodology: past, present and possible future
The National Travel Survey has collected data in essentially the same 
way since the first survey was carried out in 1965, through a face-
to-face household interview and a 7-day travel diary completed by 
respondents of all ages. The survey was carried out infrequently until 
1988, since when data collection has been continuous. Weighting for 
non-response was introduced from the mid-1990s, and from 2002 the 
annual sample size was increased substantially (from around 7000 to 
16 000 individuals). The geographical scope of the survey changed in 
2013 from residents of Great Britain to England only.
The purpose of the survey is to cover personal travel – where the 
reason for travelling is for the traveller to reach a destination. This 
excludes commercial travel (e.g. bus drivers), off-road journeys, and 
international travel, for example. The main unit of travel within the 
survey is a trip – a one-way course of travel with a single main purpose. 
Trips can consist of multiple stages, defined by a change in the form of 
transport. For instance, a journey to work could be counted as one trip 
(with a “commuting” purpose) but several stages (e.g. a cycling stage 
from home to a train station, and a train stage from the station to 
the workplace).
The NTS provides the longest and fullest time series of personal 
travel available internationally. However, like most data sources, the 
NTS has its limitations. For example, there have been some changes 
in definitions and scope over the years affecting comparability; most 
notably, the 1965 survey did not cover short walks (those under 
1 mile), and these have been estimated from later data for the 
comparisons presented here. 
There is a known drop-off in recording of trips by respondents 
throughout the travel week. A drop-off weight is used to adjust for 
this pattern. However, as short walks are only recorded on the last 
day of the diary (to minimise respondent burden), they are likely to 
be understated. Work is ongoing to explore the impact of changing 
the diary to record these on the first day, which is likely to result in a 
notable increase in the proportion of journeys made on foot, possibly 
necessitating some further weighting for historic data to maintain a 
comparable time series.
Of course, recent technological advances offer scope for reducing 
costs and respondent burden whilst improving data quality and 
modernising data collection methods. In 2011, a pilot was carried 
out to replace paper diaries with GPS devices, which 900 respondents 
carried for a week. Response rates for the GPS sample were acceptable 
(52%, compared with 59% for paper diaries) though younger 
respondents (12–24-year-olds) were found to be less likely to carry and 
return them.
The GPS devices included accelerometers – which detect relative 
motion in three planes – in an effort to improve the identification of 
mode of travel. An attempt was also made to code trip purpose from 
location of trip origin and destination. Ultimately comparison of results 
with diary data found that the processing algorithms for GPS data were 
not sufficiently well developed to produce robust data comparable with 
that collected via existing travel diaries, which have been retained for 
the current NTS. In particular, purpose was missing for around a quarter 
of trips, and there were issues with the accuracy of coding of mode, 
with too many trips classified as rail and too few walks.
As personal technology – such as smartphones and tablets – 
becomes more prevalent, exploring new data collection methods to 
ensure the survey remains relevant, and to maintain response rates for 
particular groups of respondents, is likely to be important. Ultimately, 
however, “big data” from these technologies – mobile phones in 
particular – may provide a better means of meeting the need for data to 
understand travel behaviour than the current survey-based approach. 
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Magical mirror
Improving foreign trade statistics in the Middle East
Trade between countries helps solidify relationships, but comparable statistics on 
exports and imports can be hard to come by. Nili Karsai and Helen Brusilovsky 
describe efforts to harmonise data in the Middle East using “mirror exercises”
Mickey Mouse stands in front of a magical mirror. 
Gazing at his reflection, he moves one way, but his 
mirror self does something entirely different. The poor 
cartoon mouse looks confused.
Foreign trade statisticians know how Mickey 
Mouse feels. In an ideal situation, country A’s data on 
exports to country B should be equal to country B’s 
data on imports from country A. That is, the person 
in front of the mirror and the figure reflected in the 
mirror should move in sync. 
In real life, however, there are statistical 
discrepancies in official data collection which lead 
to confusing asymmetries. This was the situation 
statisticians in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) faced.
Regional trade in the Middle East is important 
because common interests in trade help stabilise 
relationships between countries at the macro-economic 
level. This affects diplomacy, politics, and other fields, 
even if the trade volume is small.
The peace treaties between Israel and Egypt 
(1978) and Israel and Jordan (1994) led to the signing 
of trade agreements. Later, Qualifying Industrial Zone 
agreements (QIZs) were introduced – special free 
trade zones which allowed Egyptian and Jordanian 
goods to be exported directly to the US on the 
condition that Israeli inputs exceeded 10.5% of the 
product price. These trade agreements boosted the 
foreign trade of Egypt and Jordan, and increased trade 
between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan.
However, when comparing the import and export 
figures recorded by each country, discrepancies were 
evident. The statistical asymmetries found between 
Israel and its neighbours1 – including the PA – are 
presented in Figure 1. In each graph dark columns 
represent data as reported by Israel. Lighter columns 
represent reflected data as reported by the partner 
country. In theory, each pair of columns should 
be equal; however, discrepancies – both large and 
small – can be seen in the data, with the greatest data 
asymmetry occurring between Israel and Egypt.
Cooperation needed
Discrepancies such as these should be reduced as 
much as possible, because accurate statistics facilitate 
actual trade, both for government and private sectors. 
Asymmetries in bilateral trade statistics can affect 
decision-making: for example, a business might get the 
wrong idea about the size of the market for its goods if 
statistics from country A and country B are different.
One way to detect asymmetries in bilateral trade 
statistics is to employ “mirror exercises”, a methodological 
tool that is designed to reconcile trade data by identifying, 
explaining, and assessing the causes of discrepancies. 
In mirror exercises, partner countries provide 
each other with very detailed statistical data based 
on the Harmonized System (HS), an internationally 
standardised system of names and numbers to classify 
traded products, which was developed by the World 
Customs Organization. 
Next, the flow of exports from country A to 
country B is compared to the reflected flow in the 
imports received by country B, and vice versa. In 
theory the flows are supposed to be equal, but in reality 
discrepancies are found in either direction. In these 
cases, a data mining process starts, where statisticians 
attempt to identify the specific reasons for the gaps. 
Mirror exercises were conducted between Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, and the PA as part of the European 
Union’s Mediterranean Statistical Cooperation Project, 
No. 3 (Medstat III). Group members – made up of 
statisticians from each of the four territories – met 
several times during the period 2009–2013. The main 
reasons for data discrepancies between Israel and its 
neighbours were as follows.2
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First, the four partners do not use the 
same trade system. For example, Israeli data 
on exports to Egypt were twice as high as the 
import records reflected in Egypt because the 
Israeli goods that were destined for the QIZ 
had not been included in the Egyptian statistics. 
Second, the PA and Israel use VAT 
data to record their bilateral trade. In VAT 
vouchers, only a non-detailed description 
of the goods is available and it is difficult to 
obtain a detailed six-digit-level classification 
of goods. Therefore, Israel publishes the 
figures according to the economic activity 
classification of the importer/exporter firms, 
whereas the PA transforms the description in 
the voucher into HS codes. 
Third, no records were registered in the 
data on Egyptian exports to match the data 
on Israeli imports of “natural gas in a gaseous 
state” and “petroleum coke”.
Fourth, the records of Jordan’s exports 
in “apparel and clothing” goods to Israel were 
much higher than the Israeli import records, 
because Israel registered only the value added 
of the goods in imports after processing, 
instead of registering the full value of the goods. 
Finally, discrepancies between Israel and 
Jordan were due to the fact that Jordan was a 
transit country for Israeli gold and “waste of 
precious metals” goods, but Jordan was recorded 
as the final destination in Israeli records.
Reconciling the data
When comparing trade data between 
countries which allow for the use of different 
concepts and classifications,3 there will be 
built-in discrepancies. But after months 
of collaborative work there were several 
improvements in the foreign trade statistics 
produced by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the PA. 
In particular, the mirror exercises led to better 
implementation of international standards, 
coverage, harmonisation and treatment of 
specific transactions. 
Major asymmetries in Israeli and 
Egyptian data on fuel products were 
reconciled by analysing trade data from a 
new data source, while the classification gaps 
between Israel and the PA were narrowed 
by converting the PA’s classification of goods 
into Israel’s activity branch of the exporter/
importer classification. 
Discrepancies due to different concepts 
relating to goods in the QIZ zone were 
reconciled, and data on the final destination of 
exports were corrected.
The mirror exercises clearly showed that 
in order to produce quality data on bilateral 
trade, cooperation between statisticians on 
both sides is a necessity. And if better trade 
data do lead to deeper economic ties between 
the countries of the Middle East, the hope is 
that the end result is better, more prosperous 
lives for the people of this region.
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Figure 1. Data asymmetries between Israel and (a) Egypt, 2006; (b) Jordan, 2006; and (c) the Palestinian 
Authority, 2005
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